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Abstract 
Chair-man is the leader of the board, responsibile to ensure that board is effective, conlnl~lnic;ltc with thc ~li;!~-~hoi<!:-i;; 
and a good relationsl~ip between board. While tlie Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pldys a n~;ljo:. role in rnanngi~i:! ! i i i i  
ensuring the business operations. This study examines the characteristics of CEO and Cha;l.nli~n of G o v ~ r r ~ ~ ~ ~ t n i  I,iiii;i.ti 
Companies (GLCs) in Malaysia with firm perforniance using a sample of 80 companies for the prriotl 2905-2000. 'ibis 
study finds that there are positive relationship among cliair~nan's age, ethnicity, firm size and fir111 agr.. \~-l?cn rcgrr;.;sc!! <i!1 
Return on Assets (ROA). In terms of CEO characteristics, thel-e are negative relationship for professional clual~fic:~tiun, 
CEO age, Firm age with ROA. In sum, it can be conrlllded that factors such as age, e\1111icity, professio~i~rl qualific-,ition. l i r i i i  
size and firm age do influence fir111 performance. 
A ' l ~ l ~ r ~ o r . ~ / . ~ .  (;over~~ment-linked con1pa11ic.s; CEO; Chairman; Alnlaysi;j. 
- . .~ ~ - .- .- . 
I .  Introduction 
On May 14: 2010 the first high-profile removal of  the head of a GLC %as reported in all iCl;~la:.sin:i press. li:-. 
Silne Darby Bhd's group chief e.xecutive of icer  (CEO). Dafo' Ahmad Zubir Murshid was askcd 1(? t ; i l i ~  a lcii;:~ I .? 
abscncc before tlie expi ry  ol'llis contract on Nov 26, 2010. Thc Siine Darby chairman. I 'un h,lusri I litnin COil'il::'i1f.i 
that Lubir's leaving was in connection with the cost overruns ;~~nount ing  or RMOh4 million that thc L ! I ~ L I ~ ~ ' :  C'!-c(:i.:'j' 
and utilities division 11nd juffel-ed in carr) ing out projects in Qatar and the Bakun hydro-elec~ric i l n n ~ (  1 ' 1 : ~  S~;II . .  hi::!; 
14). As in Sirue Darby case. i t  5eems that top management (both thc CEO and sul>l>ost.dly rllc C'ilL~ir-nlnii'~ l : ~ :  ,i 
siglriticant influence on lirm pcrfor~nance. 'l.lius, it is interestills lo study \vlletllrr CIiO,'(~'Iiaii.~nnn c.I~ai . ;~i lz~ 1.t:: !, 
1 1 3 ~  some inlpacts on firm performance: on a wider perspective. 'rllis is in line \ i . i l l ~  vie\\:; 1.1-i11n ihv rc;t.jiii-(.:.. 
dcl~e~iderlcy theory (,RDT] that proposcs directors are appoirlted bascd o n  specific skills :11id C\I)L:I.~CI!<L 
cnil,i~.ical \~#ol.ks o n  RLIT in 'fe:;jt.sen. Seoly 'f. Singh. 2009 on \l,olnt.n on heal-ds; Sackli~ig & !ol:l. ?_li!)') q;:: hc.:z.-il 
meeting: Sinsll, 2007 o n  ethnicity on board and Chen, 1)yhall Rr WI-ight. 2009 on di\icrsific;!!iorli;!. 1 : )  !CI.I?;:; 1 : ; '  
corlir-ibtition of tlru study, this study pl.ovidcs a\:enucs on the c u r r e ~ ~ t  CI0~'C:llai1-11:an ch:iraitc~.isii~s' ~ ! c * ~ i i c : ! i  ii!
' Cnrrepnnd~lq: Noor i l r ~ a  r7rnrdn, PltD. Tcl.. + 1706-0 1.041701 118 
l i ~ r ~ : ; ~ l  od:ir~ss: ; iP~,a~.~i~i~rnl .cdu.~l iy  
Malajsian ~nar!<et. This \vork also piovides evidence on the inlportancc of  CEO'Chair~nan char~~c(cri\tic$' ill 
enhancing the firm performance 
2. Literature review and hypotlteses clevelopment 
Given tlie high responsibility and com~nitment by the stakeholders. Chainnan and CIE0 nced to crisur-e lii-1x1 
pel-formance is leading towards the company objectives. Thus. Lo be a Chairman or CEO for cornpang', an in:!ivic!~ra! 
needs to possess certain criteria and qualities and these fit with the resource dependency thcory. 7'he attribi~tec 
considered in this study are education level, professional qualification, age, gender. and ethnicit?. 
2.1 Edzrca/ion le11el 
A profecsional CEO with a higher educational backgl-ound provide a valuable human capital to t l ~ e  c o ~ ~ l j ~ a ~ i y .  ,I 
higlier educational background such as tlie post-graduate level will increase the value of individ~~al'r l i ~ ~ n i a n  c;!pir::I 
(Phan & lioon, 1995) vr as having a higlier cognitive ability. higher capacity for drcision yrocess;ny,, 1li;i:c-i- 
tolerance for ambiguity and propensity or receptivity to innovation which equip them wit11 an e f f c t i \ e  so l~ i t i c~ i~  ;: 
complex decision inaking task (Bantel & Jackson 1989). As a result, CEOs with high education qualificatio~: are 1es:: 
likely to experience turnover as their turnover portray a loss to a company ( Thomas et HI., I991 : 011-Yan Sliun~ip- 
Sliii. 2007) as the CEO serces some functional backgrounds (as argued in Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) \vhicii i~ ic l~ idc  
probleln definition. information procession and strategic choices (Rajagopalan & Dafta, 1996).Thcrcfhre. wc 
hypothesize that: 
1-1,: CEO!Cliairman of GLCs \vitIi liigher educational level has better perforniance than CEO:Chairm;~n \?it11 
lower educational level. 
2.2 Profc.ssio~ic~/ y zrnlificntioi7 
The revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2012) stresses tliat noniinatirig commitecs should 
consider recruitin2 directors that have skills, experience and qualifications. Directors' expertise . ;~~cli  as in 
accounting, financing, consulting and law suppo~ts managers in making decisions especially in spccitic btaii-:a:\s 
settings (Rrockbank, Ulrich & Reatty, 1999: Zajac & Stearns, 1997; Guner et al., 2007). and beconie niorr' eSfrcti\.,: 
strategic business partners (Lawler & Mohrnman, 2003; Anderson & Reeb. 2004). Professional appointees ~rcceivcti >i 
stronger stock market reaction (Uefond. Hann & Hu, 2005; Hillrnan, Cannella. & Paetzold. 1000) 2nd pravirie i?ritcr 
monitoring (Crickson et al.. 2005). Today's professional managers are morc likely to I?iove hc.t\zzen firm; as ant1 
when their expertise is requir-ed by all firms (Hajjes R: Abemathy, 1980). Hnsed on the ahovc arcuni<.r!t.;. 
hypothesize tliat: 
Hz: CEO!Cliairman of CLCs with professional qualification has better- performance than CEO.('hair~iiar: with no 
professional qualification. 
2.3 CE(ll'C11ilirnw111 n,qc. 
Hrockniann and Simn~onds (1997) argues that managerial success is positively co~.relatcd \ri t! i  age as niil(.i 
e~ecut ives  also tend to be Inore risk averse than younger executives (Cal.lsson R: Karlsson. 1970). l ln \~cvc: - ,  !he 
Companies Act I065 in  Malaysia prollibits tlie appointment of a pel-son of or over the age of 70 >ears as  a direcit l i '  
clf a 17~1hlic ompany or subsidia~y of n public conipriny. For listed companies, the CISOs nccti to retire ;I( I c ~ s t  ~jn;.,: 
in every three ).ears but they are eligible for re-election. Based on the a r~ :~men t s .  it is Ii~~potliesizc~d that: 
ti;: CiL,Cs wit11 older Ct:O,/Cliairnian has better perfor~nance tlian youngcr CEO~Chairinnn. 
2. -/ (;2ll~l'Pr 
M'onien lack industry experience and tl1,ry concentra(e on less profitable seclors (I.oscoccc~ et :I].. l4.)<!1: 
Alou.ailian. 1004) and as sucli creates a bar1.ic.r to business (bisclier et al.. (1903). Wornell H I S O  ~illplo:\. ii'1:i.r 
employees. and have snlaller annual salcs thau tlicir male countcr7,nrts (Shim 13 1:cstlick. ItiO:i). W o n i c ~ ~  b !\~i.c..i 
owners are found to undercapitalise their t i r r~ s ,  typically investing approximately only one Ihird of tlie i:a;lil;?l ris!:<? 
by Inen (Shaw et al., 2009). Therefore, we hyl?otllesize that: 
F14: GLCs with male CEOiChairriian has better performance than fernale CE0,'Chairmali. 
2.5 Elh17ic.itj; 
Ilofstede (1991) suggests that the t\vo main ethnic groups (Malay and Chincse) are both low on masculiriit~. I;~it 
high on power distance. The Malays have high uncertainty avoidance which is retlected Llleir uneasiness i : ~  dealin?. 
with ambiguities and uncertainty. They ellcourage collectivis~ii, but at the same time thcy are more secrerii.e :\!:is11 
implies low disclosure. In contrast, the Chinese are rated as low uncertainty avoidance. individualis~ic. \r.ii!ing lo 
accept new challenges and willing to take a greater risk (tianiffa Br Cooke, 2002,). I l o~ , cve r ,  majority ofi;i .C'c ;Ire 
headed by Malay leaders, thus we hypothesize that: 
FI!: Malay CEOiCliair~nan of  G1,Cs has better pertbrniance than Chinese CEOIChairman. 
3. Research methodology 
3. 1 .Y0111plc size 
This study utilised using the secondary data over (lie period of  2005 to 2909 (5 years). A li.1 cT ti1,Cs \v;rs 
obtained from the website I~np:liwww.pcg.gov.my. Data on CEOIChair-man profilc such as profi.ssici~i,~l 
qualification, education level, age, gender and ethnicity were hand-collected using the annual reports. ROA dat<l was 
gathered from Thomson Financial Datastream Advance. 
PERF,, = ho t blEllUC,, -7 h2PROP;, r b3AGE,, i hJGENDER,, + b5E1'11NIC,, i b,DFBT,, t I,7F:,4(iE,, ! -  I>:F'SI%F~.::~ 
el1 
3.1 blncl'rl speclfic.a/ic~n 
'The dependent variable ROA is the ratio of accounting earnings before interesl and taxes to tllc book value of 
assets. The use o f  ROA as a performance measure is more preferable than othcr accounting Ineasures (1<01<. FPS) 
because the operating income used to calculate R(.)tl is not influenced by special charges and also lcss susccptiblc. to 
manipulation by rnanagers (Bushman & Smith, 2001). For CEO/Cllairman attributes such as educalion ic~i.1. 
professional qualification, age, gender and ethnicity \vel-e measured using du~nrny (0.1). l'he co~itrol variables \+,ex 
del~t. firm agc and firm size. Dehl is the book value ol'long-term debt divided by total assets. 1-irm .1ge is :11< ~?u!i?her 
of  years since incorporation. Firm size is tlie natural log o f  book balue otJer total assets. 
3. Filldings and discussions 
Based on Table 1. r-esults reveal that ma.jority of Chairman (00.3°/n) and CEO (66Sb) d o  possess a dcsrxc 
qualification. 21.394) of  the Chairman are professionally qualitied, and 22.19; CEOs are proil-s;ioiially cli~a.lii;l-:l. 
Lvcn though the numher is still low but the professional quaiitication adds credibility lo :I person ; ~ n t l  tic i-, rc!i.ri cil 
to as 'expert' in  his arca. C'liairnian of 51-70 >,ears amounted to 66.4Sh. wit11 tlie youiigcst at the asccl of' i I u i l t i  i i : ~  
eldest at 01 yra1.c. For ~ l l e  CEO. thc pcrccntage is 66.290 for CEO of 5 1-70 years \+ it11 mininiurri ;I?,C of -3 1 3 1 i c i  g: l~ / r< :  r 
at 64 years. GI.Cs d o  ha\:e rnore m;tlc Chairman (77.696) and CI:C) (85.5"i) as compareti to l'c~!ialu ('iinii.tn;.i! 
(22.-1°6) and ('EO (l4.596). Mniority of Chairman lbr C.iL,Cs (74. I?;,) are Mala)s. Ihllo\r,t.d 1?), 19.7'0 (~'liine*;~ :in<.! 
ol'threign Cl~airman. For tlir CEO. GL.Cs cornlirise 73.376 Malays, l2.jY6 Chinese and 1.l..li'i# Ii)rciyl ('I:( j.
-- . - .  Clta~rliirui -- ('IF(') 




Wilh profcsslonal qualiiica~ion 
W~lhoul professional qual~ticalio~l 
30-50 )-cars old 
51 -70 years old hb.4 GO 7 





Foreigner 6.2 11.2 
- 
With reference to  Table 2 (Panel A). there is a positivc I-elationship between Cl ia i r~nan age  and firm i-c'rii)~~::iai!ce 
(IiOA). Older  chairman has higher level o f  experience (Carlsson & Karlsson. 1970) and i i l a ~ h c ~  risl; a\li,i.s~: 
(Brocknianr~ Rr Si1nnionds,1997). AI-guably. such chairman o f  tlie board could provide a check ant1 balance Ic. ti:c 
manasement  team led by (lie CEO.  Etlinicity a lso  s l i o \ v ~  a positike rc la t~onship w ~ t l i  the  firm performa~ice .  l iic 
Malay Chairman was  found to be  associaied higher firm perlormance. The  Malays have liigli uncer ta i~ ty  a t o i d a r ~ c c  
wliicli is reflected their uneasiness in dealing with ambiguities and uncertainty. T'hey encourage collccti\ism. hut at 
die same  t ime they a re  more secretive which implies low disclosure. 
Table 2. K~mssion a n i ~ l ~ s i s  f<)r CI?airnian nnd Ck'QcIiar~c&rtscl~~:s :11id~m1pc_rf~rmanci' 
- p~ - ~. -. - .  .- . ~
Panel '4: Chairman P : I I I ~  1%: ( : K O  
-  - - . . 
CocL Std. error I Y> 1 roes. Std. rrrol- t I , . .  
I<ducal inn -.0 122486 0230027 -0.53 0 505 .01 63816 0206S35 o P F  Q ~:, Q 
l'rol'ess~ut~al 0379732 020653 I .X4 0.067 -.097751? .iilX8350 - 5  I0 ( i i ~ o i ~  
t l ~ c  ,0050623 .00 1023 4.95 0.000 -.0046773 .OO 12831 -; 6.i ( I  Oi)(r 
Gc~ider 01 4301-4 .Oh35712 0 22 0 8.22 -.(I5655 I3 0604.%29 -0 X I  !I .< 7l i> 
I-IIIIIIC ,0723295 .0161829 3.38 0.0(10 .0741046 000h86 7.1,O (i (to(! 
Ilchl 3.42e- I0 5.30s-10 0.63 0.528 -3.98e- 10 5. I Oc- I0 -0 ;:$ , j  
kirm a?,e .0010888 ,0005576 1.95 0.052 0007124 .00038 16 1 i? 0 125 
kinn sirc -7.662-10 2.86~-10 -2 68 n.008 -4 85-I1  2 i2e-I0 -0. 19 OX47 
ConslanLs -3331344 .0827379 -4.04 0 (!OO .2590354 0977686 2 f,6 n OOS 
]~r<!h :. 1: 0 0001 r 0.i1000 
R-qqt~nrcd 0 l i6') 0 3 l hS 
ildi R' 0. I286 0 2904 
p-. ~ - -- - . ~ ~ ~. 
In contrasl. tlie Chinese are  ratecl as lo\v :lnccrtainry a\oidallce.  intlividucllistic. \villing to r lcccp( new cl;nllc.!;;:c~ 
aiid \villins to take a grcater (t lali ifl i  cP: C:oohc. 2002). 111 tcl-ms of  firm age. ~risllrrctl ct~n?!~:il:i~.: ;!I;;.; ~q?~:i.;itc i i l  
the rnnrhel d o  contrilwte to better fili.~n value. and s ~ n a l l  size cnmpailies do perfbrlii better ar comp;ii.ctl t c i  !.:12e 
companies.  For 1''lblc 2 (Pancl B), there is a sig~iificant ~iegat i \c .  relatiorisliip between pro1k:;ioiial cl~l;~lii ici!l i?)~~ ~ ; i '  
!he CEO and CEO age \villi firm per-Sorniancc wl l ic l~  is quite haftling. Younger ('ECls pcrinrni b c ~ c l -  pel h;li~:- tiri,: 
that >oungcr  C E O  tend to bc more cncrgetic. aggl-tsivl: in action taking and \:illilly to t 2 1 I i ~ '  (Iic risk. i i i  It:rni\ i,i 
cthnicity. t!iis factor d o  add 1117 the fir111 pt'rfbrniancc. \Vliilst. education and zender  (for both ('li:ii~.n-iai~ ; rl!i i ' F0 ,  :Fo 
nni have any cffect on  perforniance. 
-1 
The study finds some evidence the experience of the older chairman and the agg~.esivc~icss of'the youn2C.i. C'::<: 
work as a better conibinatiorl to achieving higher firm performance rather than having both oldcl- chairman alxl i ' i!i i 
or younger chairman and CEO although this speculation needs more careful futurc siudies. '1.h~ rcsult u n  c~iiriiuii\. 
altl~ough seems preliminary. still is indicative enough to suggest that major ethnic would be appointed on .it\c~c~:ri:i 
GIXs  as it also a part of the New Economic Policy (NEP) initiatives set LIP by the ruling psrLy. A l t l ~ v u ~ l ~  tile ~ l u d i  
is limited to GLCs and its matched pair, i t  could bc argued that the government selects companies thal c:oulJ rcacl~ 
public at large to bc under its stable as it would have more direct and indirect iinpacts on government policics a!lcl 
could be generalized to similar state-business mechanisni which is familiar in Asian region. 
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